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Book Reviews
Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life:
A Philosophical View
Ba ruch Brody
The MIT Press, 28 Carleton St., Cambridge, Mass. 02142. 1975, 162 p., $8.95

Baruch Brody's book on abortion is not just another handbook
on the subject. If Philosophy has
any contribution to make to the
abortion debate, it is to undercut
the psychological, social, and religious rhetoric and to allow people to investigate the question on
a rational, ethical level. Filled
with sensitivity towards the
mother and her rights in the abortion dilemma, Brody nonetheless
faces the difficult questions in a
concise manner: when may we
take a life, when does human life
begin, what are the rights of the
fetus.
The author surveys thoroughly
but succinctly the arguments for
ana against abortion. In his chapter on "The Morality of Abortion," he handles the arguments
about the mother's right to her
body, abortion for the sake of the
unwanted child, and the analogical argument that abortion is another form of self-defense. To
counter these points, he notes,
"It is surely true that one way
in which women have been oppressed is by their being denied
authority over their own bodies.
But it seems to be that, as the
struggle is carried on for meaningful amelioration of such oppression, it ought not to be carried so far that it violates the
May, 1976

steady responsibilities all people
have to one another. Parents may
not desert their children, one
class may not oppress another,
one race or nation may not exploit another. For parents, powerful groups in society, races or nations in ascendancy, there are
penalties for refraining from these
wrong actions, but those penalties can in no way be taken as the
justitfication for such wrong actions. Similarly, if the fetus is a
human being, the penalty for carrying it cannot, I believe, be used
as the justification for destroying
it."
This last point is the author's
most outstanding contribution to
the abortion question. For proabortionist have argued, as has
the Supreme Court, that there is
no way that we can decide whether or not the fetus is human. They
claim that such idle speculation
is akin to the Scholastic Philosophers arguing over the question
of how many angels could dance
on the head of a pin. But Brody
meets the difficulty squarely with
a theory of essentialism. Basically, Brody asks, what is the distinction between the properties
that an object has essentially and
the properties that it has accidentally? If there are properties
that an object must have to exist
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and without them it would cease
to exist as that object, then these
are the properties that an object
has essentially. With this basis
established, Brody sets out to determine what properties are essential for being human and at.
what point does a fetus have
these properties. He rejects the
theory that the fetus is human at
the moment of conception; for although the biological characteristics of the fetus have by then
been determined, it does not follow that the fetus already has all
these properties. "What the fetus
has is the chromosomal mechanism by which the properties are
finally produced. Therefore, it
does not follow that the fetus out
of which "A" will develop is identical with "A" and, like "A," is
a human being."
Brody takes his stand concerning the beginning of human life
from the opposite spectrum,
through an analysis of death.
Arguing from recent studies
about the time of death, Brody
says, "The traditional definition
of death, we could all agree, needs
to be modified one more time to
read: a person is dead only if
there has been an irreparable cessation of spontaneous and natural
cardiac and respiratory functions
and there has been an irreparable

cessation of brain function. But
suppose we have the latter condition without the former one,
wherein t he brain has ceased to
function but the heart and lungs
have not ... is the person dead
if his brain has suffered irreparable and massive damage whatever the state of his heart and
lungs?" To this question, Brody
would say yes, and so he concludes that there is only one property which is essential to humanity and that is the possession of a
brain that has not suffered an irreparable cessation of function.
He then maintains that the
fetus acquires the potential of essential humanity when the fetus
actuates the structures of a functioning brain, which comes at
about six weeks. While traditional Catholic thought would push
back the time of personhood even
further, Brody's position is certainly more plausible than the
Supreme Court's which has evaded the issue or put humanity at
the time of viability; and Brody's
chapter on "Abortion and the Supreme Court" is a lucid and logical critique on the Court's shoddy
thinking in this area.
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